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Constitutional Problems
of County Home Rule in Ohio
Earl L. Shoup
THE AMENDMENT to the Ohio Constitution adopted in Novem-
ber, 1933,1 granting the privilege of home rule to counties, gen-
erated a whole series of constitutional problems just as had the
municipal home rule amendment of 1912.2 After more than a
third of a century of judicial interpretation the boundaries of the
area of municipal autonomy are in a fluid state.
Home rule is the term commonly used to designate the grant
by constitutional provision or statute of the right of self-govern-
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ment to a political sub-
division of the state.'
Since a statutory grant
of this kind is revocable
at the pleasure of the
legislature, the term is
more properly applied
to a constitutional grant.
The various local op-
tion laws with respect
to the sale of intoxicat-
ing liquors giving the
right of local prohibi-
tion to townships, mu-
nicipalities and counties were examples of statutory home rule in
a limited field.4 Prior to 1912, when the municipal home rule
1 Omo CONST. Art. X, §§ 1-4.
2 Osno CONST. Art. XVIII, §§ 1-9. Previous to this several states, by special
constitutional authorization, had given home rule of greater or less degree to
individual city-counties: Maryland to Baltimore in 1851 [M. CONST. Art. III,§§ 2, 3; 3 THORPE, THE FEDERAL, AND STATE CoNSTrTUTIoNs, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTm ORGANIC LAWS 1721]; Missouri to St. Louis in 1875
[Mo. CONST. Art. IX, § 20; 4 THORPE, op. cit. at 2257, 2258]; Colorado to
Denver in 1902 [CoLo. CONST. Art. XX, §§ 1-8]. A constitution, silent on
county organization, enabled California to make a similar grant to the City
and County of San Francisco by statute in 1858 [Cal. Stat. 1858, c. 108. See
also the Consolidation Act of 1856, Cal. Stat. 1856, c. 125; NATIONAL MtmNC-
PAL LEAGUE, Tim GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 175 (1930)].
3 8 Omo Jum., Constitutional Law §§ 2-8, 209, 210.
4 83 Ohio Laws 157; 85 Ohio Laws 87, 517; Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing
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amendment was adopted, no political subdivision of Ohio pos-
sessed any degree of home rule by constitutional mandate. The
municipalities, as well as all other subdivisions, possessed only
such powers as were delegated to them by the General Assembly,
and these might be altered at any legislative session.5
Much of the difficulty in the interpretation of home rule
stems from the constitutional nature of the state itself. While the
states are members of a national federal union, individually they
are unitary in nature. In the absence of state constitutional pro-
visions to the contrary, the central state government is supreme
in all matters not delegated to the federal government. Units of
local government in number, character and powers are established
by the state on the principle of need and convenience.' The
powers they exercise are delegated state powers. So long as the
delegation was by statute, judicial interpretation of their metes
and bounds was of less moment because subject to subsequent
legislative modification. The establishment of constitutional munic-
ipal home rule, however, was a fundamental change.' The state's
sovereign powers were split in two, giving a limited federal char-
acter to the unitary state. The city council as well as the General
Assembly was now supreme in its own field.
The line of demarcation between the state and municipal
fields was left to be traced by the courts in the course of routine
litigation. On the one side is the general legislative supremacy of
the General Assembly; on the other, "all powers of local self-
Board, 91 Ohio St. 176, 110 N.E. 485 (1915); Haynerv. State, 83 Ohio St. 178,
93 N.E. 900 (1910); Gordon v. State, 46 Ohio St. 607, 23 N.E. 63 (1889).
5 Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923);
Commissioners of Portage County v. Gates, 83 Ohio St. 19, 93 N.E. 255 (1910);
Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118, 12 N.E. 445 (1887); Bloom v.
Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461 (1877); Commissioners of Lake County v. Commis-
sioners of Ashtabula County, 24 Ohio St: 393 (1873).
6 1 McQuLLIN, TiE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 145 (2d ed. 1945).
7 "The Legislature may, within the limits of the Constitution, give the munici-
pal corporation all the powers such an artificial personality is capable of re-
ceiving, and make it, to use the expression of the Supreme Court of the United
States, a miniature state within its locality." 1 MCQULLIN, op. cit. supra note 6,
§ 145, citing Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38, 13 Sup. Ct. 750, 752 (1893).
"As to both form of organization and conduct of the municipal government, a
constitutional charter must always conform to the state constitution and laws
enerally operative throughout the state." 1 MCQuiLLiN, op. cit. supra note 6,
342, p. 928. An excessive delegation of powers to the municipality would
probably be violative of the Federal requirement of a republican form of
government and implied sovereignty of the state. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 4;
People v. Cassidy, 50 Colo. 503, sub. nom. People v. Curtice, 117 Pac. 357
(1911); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167 (1903).
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government", including the adoption and enforcement of "such
local police, sanitary, and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with general laws".' The language of this definition of
the municipal area of government, with its combination of a
broad general grant and specific grants, has been too much for
judicial artistry.9 And yet with the wavering conceptions of mu-
nicipal powers, as will be discussed hereafter, is intimately bound
up some basic problems of county home rule.
THE NATURE OF THE COUNTY AND ITS FUNCTIONS
The county is the primary political subdivision of the State of
Ohio, as it is of all the states of the Union outside New England."0
This thousand-year-old institution, including several of its typi-
cal offices, is deeply embedded in the common law as well as in
the consciousness of the people. The power of the state to create
territorial subdivisions for the conduct of its government, whether
counties, municipalities, townships or special districts, is a neces-
sary corollary of the doctrine of state sovereignty, and would
inhere in the General Assembly even if not conferred by the state
constitution. On the other hand, if the state constitution confers
the powers of self-government on the people of any locality, large
or small, even though this should involve the abolition of ancient
units of local government, this is the supreme law of the state,
binding on the courts as well as the legislature.
8 Omo CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3.
9 The inherent difficulty in drawing a line between state and municipal powers
is set forth by McQuillin: "Repeated attempts by constitution framers, legisla-
tors, and courts have been successful in part only, and sometimes have intro-
duced doubt and confusion." 1 McQU.Lwr, op. cit. supra note 6, § 194. The
consequence is there are no well established rules or principles by which to
determine what are municipal and what are state affairs. Ibid. In Ohio, par-
ticularly, no determinable rule has been established by the courts. Hitchcock,
Ohio Ordinances in Conflict with General Laws, 16 U. CiN. L. Rzv. 1 (1942).
"Indisputably these provisions are hazy and ambiguous, and it is un-
fortunate that the members of the constitutional convention did not more fully
define the powers of local self-government committed to chartered cities, and
thus relieve the courts from exercise of wide discretion and from never ending
appeals for construction of this constitutional clause; and likewise relieve the
judicial department of the government from the criticism too often made that
it has exercised the power of framing a constitution-a power that has been
lodged solely in the people." Jones, J., in State ex rel. Toledo v. Cooper, 97
Ohio St. 86, 91, 119 N.E. 253, 254 (1917).
10 Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404 (1838); Russell v. The Men of
Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (Ch. 1788); FAIRLrE AND KNmR,
CouNTY GOvERNMENT AND ADMISTRATION 23-36 (1930); HOWARD, LocAL
CONSTITMTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 298-301, 358, 365, 368 (1889).
19491
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Ordinance of 1787, for the government of the territory
northwest of the Ohio River, provided that the Governor should
"proceed, from time to time, as circumstances may require, to
lay out the parts of the district in which the Indian titles shall
have been extinguished, into counties and townships, subject, how-
ever, to such alterations as may thereafter be made by the legis-
lature."" Acting under this authority, Governor St. Clair in 1788
laid out the huge county of Washington, which comprised,
roughly speaking, the eastern half of the present State of Ohio.
Hamilton County, as laid out in 1790 and extended in 1792,
embraced the greater share of the western half of Ohio and the
eastern half of the southern peninsula of the present State of
Michigan. By the time of its admission to the Union in 1803,
the territory of Ohio had been divided into ten counties .1 2  By
successive subdivisions, a total of eighty-eight counties eventually
appeared. The state's first constitution definitely conferred on
the General Assembly the power to establish counties, with the
sole limitation that none should be reduced to less than 400 square
miles." This provision remains unchanged except for the addi-
tion that all changes of county lines must be ratified by popular
referendum in the counties affected.' 4
The county historically was created to discharge functions of
significance to the state as a whole. This was well stated by the
court in an Illinois case: "County and township organizations
are created in this State with a view to carrying out the policy
of the State at large for the administration of matters of political
government, finance, education, taxing, care of the poor, military
organizations, means of travel and the administration of justice.
The powers and functions of county and township organizations,
therefore, as distinguished from municipal corporations, have a
direct and exclusive bearing on and reference to the general,
rather than local, policy of government of the State."' 5 In a
federal case, decided in 1845, Chief Justice Taney, speaking of
the Maryland counties, used the language: "The several counties
are nothing more than certain portions of territory into which
the state is divided for the more convenient exercise of the powers
11 § 8.
12 PATTERSON, Tim CONSTITUTIONS OF OHIO 71, 72 (1912).
13 Omo CONST. Art. VII, § 3 (1802); PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 46.
14 OiO CONST. Art. II, § 30.
1s Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 240, 142 N.E. 512, 513 (1924); see
FA.mu AND KNREn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 42.
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of government. They form together one political body in which
the sovereignty resides."16 The language of the court in a recent
North Carolina case is typical of rulings found in decisions in all
the states of the Union: ".... all the powers and functions of a
county bear reference to the general policy of the State, and are
in fact an integral portion of the general administration of State
policy."'
7
Speaking for the Ohio Supreme Court in 1857, Judge
Brinkerhoff drew the line between the position of counties and
municipalities as political units in the following words:
Counties are local subdivisions of a State, created by the
sovereign power of the State, of its own sovereign will,
without the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent
action of the people who inhabit them. The former organi-
zation [a municipality] is asked for, or at least assented to
by the people it embraces; the latter is superimposed by
a sovereign and paramount authority.
A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for
the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality
and its people; a county organization is created almost
exclusively with a view to the policy of the State at large,
for purposes of political organization and civil administra-
tion, in matters of finance, of education, of provision for
the poor, of military organization, of the means of travel
and transport, and especially for the general administration
of justice. With scarcely an exception, all the powers and
functions of the county organization have a direct and ex-
clusive reference to the general policy of the State, and
are, in fact, but a branch of the general administration of
that policy."'s
The major portion of the functions of the county are gener-
ally the same in all the states of the Union outside of New Eng-
land.'" That they are concerned primarily with questions of
state policy is plainly evident by a partial enumeration of those
conferred on counties in Ohio. These include the assessment and
collection of taxes and the custody of public funds,2" the survey-
16 Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 3 How. (44 U.S.) 534, 550 (1845).
17 Martin v. Commissioners of Wake County, 208 N.C. 354, 365, 180 S.E. 777,
783 (1935), quoting from O'Berry v. Mecklenburg County, 198 N.C. 357, 360,
151 S.E. 880, 882 (1930). See also Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142
N.E. 512 (1924).
18 Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 118 (1857).
19 FAmLm AND KNIER, CouNTY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 238 (1930).
20 Omo GEN. CODE §§ 2583, 2638 to 2749.
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ing of lands, 21 the recording of land titles,22 institutional care of
the poor" and the arrest, detention and prosecution of offenders
against the criminal laws of the state.24 As the state becomes more
urban in character, requiring the extension of the police power,
the General Assembly from time to time imposes on the county,
as a convenient repository, the administration of some of these
laws. Examples include the provisions for the hospitalization of
the poor,25 the care of the tubercular26 and orphans,2" soldiers'
and sailors' relief,28 old age pensions9 and sewer 0 and water
supply3' systems.
In view of the character of the functions and services per-
formed by the counties, it is plain that full power to legislate on
them could not be delegated to the individual counties without
the destruction of the unity of the state government. With a few
exceptions, the task of the county is to administer state policy.
But with respect to the form and the machinery of government
to administer the state laws, there is not only no inherent reason
for uniformity but an actual necessity for the adaptation of the
governments of the varying counties to the administrative prob-
lems which confront them. With these conclusions, the county
home rule amendment, as adopted, is entirely consistent.
THE COUNTY HOME RULE AMENDMENT
The county home rule amendment32 is in the form of a com-
plete substitute for Article X of the Ohio Constitution, which
covered the matters of county and township government and, by
implication, required uniformity throughout the State. Section 1
requires the General Assembly to provide by general law for the
organization and government of counties. This section further
provides that individual municipalities and townships by contract
may transfer to the county any of their powers. The rights of
initiative and referendum are reserved to the people of such mu-
21 Id. § 2792.
22 Id. § 2757.
2 Id. §§ 2419-1, -2, -3, 2522.
24 Id. §§ 2833, 2843, 2850, 2916.
25 Id. §§ 3127 to 3138-1.
26 Id. §§ 3127 to 3147.
27 Id. §§ 3070, 3077.
28 Id. §§ 2930 to 2949-4.
29 Id. § 1359-12.
30 Id. §§ 6602-10 to 6602-14.
31 Id. §§ 6602-17 to 6602-33c.
32 OMO CONST. Art. X, §§ 1-4.
[December
COUNTY HOME RULE
nicipalities or townships in respect to every measure making or
revoking such transfer.
Section 2 covers the subject of township government. The
right of county home rule and the procedure to be followed in
securing it are the subject-matters of Sections 3 and 4.
Home rule may extend to either substantive or adjective mat-
ters, or to both. Home rule in substantive matters gives the power
to legislate on matters affecting individual rights and privileges,
including the services performed for the public such as water
supply and the maintenance of peace. Home rule in adjective
matters gives the power to legislate on matters of the form of
government, including the number and arrangement of offices,
administrative procedure and electoral processes. The municipal
home rule amendment conferred substantive powers covering "all
matters of local self-government", including such "local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws", and adjective powers to "frame and adopt or
amend a charter for its government".33 The county home rule
amendment, on the other hand, so far as it applies only to county
affairs, confers only adjective power, in the words, "provide the
form of government of the county and . . . determine which of
its officers shall be elected and the manner of their election.' 34
The General Assembly remains the arbiter as to what services
the county may discharge." Governmental machinery set up in
a county charter must be made to conform to the substantive
powers which the legislature has conferred. Conversely, any sub-
sequent legislation depriving counties generally of a function now
possessed, such as the recording of land titles, would necessitate
a corresponding alteration in the structure of the county gov-
ernment.
The amendment, however, gives the alternative of going be-
yond county powers and provides that a county charter may take
a second step by including one, a few, or many of the powers of
municipalities; or a third step, by incorporating the county as a
municipal corporation proper, and so merging all the powers of
the constituent municipalities and townships with those of the
county. The constitutional problems arising from each of these
three plans will be taken up in the reverse order in which they are
here listed.
33 OMO CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3.
34 OIo CONST. Art. X, § 3.
35 1 MCQiLLN, THE LAw or MuNicPAL CORPORATIONS § 145 (2d ed. 1945).
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A CHARTER INCORPORATING THE COUNTY AS A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION
A. What is a "municipal corporation" within the meaning of
Article X of the Ohio Constitution?
That artificial being, known as a corporation, is supposed to
have originated with the Romans, who used it both for public
and private purposes; hence the distinction between public and
private corporations." Rome, until its later days, was a city-state,
and Italy was ruled as a collection of cities of various grades,
known as coloniae, praefecturae, municipia or civitates foederata.
The two last-named classes were corporate entities with a con-
siderable degree of independence. The term municipium came
to be a generic term covering all classes of cities; hence, the laws
obtaining in them were municipal laws. The term came to mean
the internal, civil, public or national laws of a country as opposed
to external or international laws." The municipality as a public
corporation existed in the early days of the English monarchy.3"
This broader meaning of the term "municipal" was adopted by
Blackstone," 9 the mentor of the earlier generations of American
jurists, and so was firmly established in the terminology of our
jurisprudence.
A search of American statutes and constitutions shows that
during the greater part of the nineteenth century, the term
municipal corporation was used in Blackstonian sense as equiva-
lent to civil, public or political corporation. Thus in the consti-
tutions of Alabama, North Carolina and Montana, cities, counties,
and townships are all designated as municipal corporations."
Moreover, the courts in a number of states, among which are
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, California, North and South Carolina,
Oklahoma, Texas, Washington and Wyoming, have classed coun-
ties or other state districts as municipal corporations, meaning
36 1 BL. COMMENTARIES *468; MoPxy, OumnsS OF RoAN LAW 50 (2d ed.
1914).
37 MoPEy, op. cit. supra note 36, at 50, 51; PosTE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN
LAW 335 (1902); 1 BL. COMMENTARIES *44.
38 TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 78 (7th ed. 1911).
39 "I call it municipal law, in compliance with common speech; for, though
strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single municipium
or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or
nation, which is governed by the same laws or customs." 1 BL. COMMENTARIES
*44.
40 ALA. CONST. Art. XII; MONT. CONST. Art. XVI; N.C. CONST. Art. VII.
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thereby public corporations.41 Counties in New York were by stat-
ute designated as municipal corporations.2 In late years, with the
increased importance of urban communities, the term "municipal
corporation" has come to be used chiefly as the designation of an
incorporated city or village; which narrower use has resulted in
some confusion.42
Following this analysis, public corporations-that is, those in-
tended to assist in the conduct of civil governments-fall into two
classes: municipal corporations and simple public corporations. 4
The text of the Ohio Constitution as amended in 1912 leaves
no doubt as to the sense in which the term municipal corporation
was there employed. Article XVIII, styled "Municipal Corpo-
rations", begins, "Municipal corporations are hereby classified
into cities and villages". If any further identification were neces-
sary, Section 3 goes on to state that these shall have authority
to exercise "all powers of local self-government. . . ." The Con-'
stitution of 1851, as originally adopted, treated cities and villages
along with private corporations under the heading of "Corpora-
tions", while counties and townships were covered in separate
articles.4" The Ohio county never has had the status even of a
simple public corporation. In the language of Judge Sutliff, it is
a mere "political organization of certain of the territory within
the state, particularly defined by geographical limits, for the more
convenient administration of the laws and police power of the
state, and for the convenience of the inhabitants."4 Partaking
41 Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 3 Otto (93 U.S.) 108 (1876);
Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 2 Otto
(92 U.S.) 307 (1876); In re Sanitary Board of East Fruitvale Sanitary Dist.,
158 Cal. 453, 111 Pac. 368 (1910); Maulding v. Skillet Fork River Drainage
Dist., 313 Inl. 216, 145 N.E. 227 (1924); People v. Bowman, 247 Inl. 276, 93
N.E. 244 (1910); People v. Nibbe, 150 Ini. 269, 37 N.E. 217 (1894); Curry v.
District Township of Sioux City, 62 Iowa 102, 17 N.W. 191 (1883); Gooch v.
Gregory, 65 N.C. 142 (1871); Territory v. Hopkins, 9 Okla. 935, 59 Pac. 976(1899); Glenn v. County of York, 6 S.C. 412 (1873); Brite v. Atascosa County,
247 S.W. 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Weatherwax v. Grays Harbor County,
116 Wash. 212, 199 Pac. 303 (1921).
42 N. Y. COUNTY LAW § 3; Kennedy v. Queens County, 47 App. Div. 250,
62 N. Y. Supp. 276 (2d Dep't 1900).
43Of. the interpretation given the term by FAiRuaE AND KNIER, COUNTY
GOVERNMENT ANDADINISTRATION 41-42 (1930).
44 "The phrase 'municipal corporations', in the contemplation of this treatise,
has reference to incorporated villages, towns, and cities, with power of local ad-
ministration, as distinguished from other public corporations, such as counties
and quasi-corporations." 1 DILLON, COIMENTARMS ON THE LAW OF MuNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 34, p. 62 (5th ed. 1911).
45 Art. X, XIII.
46 Hunter v. Commissioners of Mercer County, 10 Ohio St. 515, 520 (1860);
1949)
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of some of the qualities of a corporation, it has been classed as a
quasi corporation.47 A statute raises every county which adopts a
charter to the dignity of a simple public corporation;4 but under
the county home rule amendment, any county may adopt a
charter declaring itself a municipal corporation proper,4 by
which act it not only continues to discharge the powers and func-
tions vested in counties and county officers but also attains the
status and powers defined for such municipalities in Article XVIII.
B. Whether such an incorporated county would remain a county
within the meaning of the constitution and laws.
Would the act of incorporation as a municipal corporation
have the effect of setting off the territory of the county as an
entirely new and distinct entity? The experience of several other
states throws some light on the question. San Francisco was set
off from the rural portion of its county by an act of the legislature
in 1856 and given the status of a "city and county"."0 In 1879,
this arrangement was fortified by a constitutional amendment.51
Denver in like manner was constituted a "city and county" in
1902."2 Baltimore, in 1851, " and St. Louis, in 1875,"- by con-
stitutional amendment were set off from the counties of which
they had been a part, but were not given the title of "county".
However, for many purposes they were counties. In the case of
Baltimore, most of the county offices were continued and made
elective by the electors of the city;55 in the case of St. Louis, a
Missouri Court of Appeals, in 1877, ruled that "because the
organization of this body as a city is pronounced and its features
strongly marked, and because they thus reduce its attributes as a
county into comparative insignificance, it does not follow that the
latter do not exist", 6 and this ruling was later confirmed by the
Supreme Court of the state."
see also Carder v. Commissioners of Fayette County, 16 Ohio St. 354, 369
(1865); Commissioners of Gallia County v. Holcombe, 7 Ohio Rep. 232 (1835).
47 Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857).
48 Omo GEN. CODE § 2394-1.
49 Omo CoNsT. Art. X, § 3.
5 Cal. Stat. c. 125 (1856).
51 CAL. CONST. Art. IV, § 31.
52 COLO. CoNsT. Art. XX, §§ 1-8.
5 M. CoNsr. Art. III, §§ 2, 3.
54 Mo. CONsT. Art. IX, § 20.
55 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, Tsi GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS
182 (1930).
s6 Missouri ex rel. Beach v. Finn, 4 Mo. App. 347, 350 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1877).
57 State ex rel. Francis v. Dillon, 87 Mo. 487 (1885).
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The case of an Ohio county chartered as a municipal corpo-
ration proper is different. In all four instances cited above, the
status of the city or county was determined by a constitutional
amendment applying only to that particular case; the Ohio con-
stitutional amendment is of general application. Sections 6 and
7 of Article IV, providing for Courts of Appeals and Probate
Courts, premise the division of the entire territory of the state
into counties, and the Schedule to the constitution adopted in
1912, by naming the counties of the state, has the effect of con-
tinuing their existence.5" The home rule amendment, itself, by
requiring all charters to make provision for the "exercise of all
powers vested in, and the performance of all duties imposed upon
counties and county officers by law", continues in full vigor the
large body of substantive laws of the state relating to counties.
There would seem to be no reasonable doubt that a county or-
ganized as a municipal corporation remains among the counties
of the state.
C. Whether home rule would extend to all county functions.
The question of the extent of the immunity of a city-county
municipal corporation from the jurisdiction of the General As-
sembly would not seem to be one of great difficulty. The conclu-
sion follows logically from a consideration of the limited grant
of county home rule made in Article X and of the legal status,
nature and functions of the Ohio county, as summarized above.
Cities operate on the level of local affairs; counties, mainly, are
agencies for the administration of state policies. The city-county
would have neither more nor less than the sum total of home rule
powers which would be possessed by the constituent cities and
the county if operating individually under the home rule pro-
visions of the constitution. " As a municipality, the city-county
would have immunity from state legislation in both its substantive
and adjective powers; as a county, in its adjective powers only.
The General Assembly would have the same right, by general
law, to vest non-municipal powers in the city-county, or to with-
draw such powers from it and transfer them to other units of
government, as it would have had if such a county had proceeded
to a simple reorganization of its existing powers by charter.60
58 OMo CONST. Schedule §§ 19, 20; see also Art. XI, § 7.
59 1 MCQUMLIN, THE LAW oF MuICIPAL CORPORAIONS §§ 88, 145, 250 (2d
ed. 1945).
6o Ibid.
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D. The status of the constituent municipalities and townships.
The county home rule amendment arranges in climactic order
the three plans which may be followed in framing a charter: (1)
confine its scope to county powers alone; (2) include a concur-
rent or exclusive exercise in all or part of its area, of any or all
powers vested in municipalities; or (3) organize the county as a
municipal corporation. 1 The implication seems plain that, in the
last-named plan, the constituent municipalities cease to exist and
are merged with the county in one municipal corporation. That
two municipal corporations, each vested with "all the powers of
local self-government", can not exist on the same territory would
seem self-evident.62 The incorporation of a county as a municipal
corporation under Article X would act as a dissolution of all the
constituent municipalities and their merging in the new city-
county. As provided in the same article, this body would succeed
to the rights, properties and obligations incident to their municipal
powers, but new taxing districts could be created for the purpose
of discharging the debts of the extinct units.63
E. Whether a borough-plan or federated city-county is authorized.
In the borough plan of metropolitan government, the urban
area is divided into districts to each of which is given a certain
amount of administrative autonomy in local matters. 4 The gov-
ernment of New York City under its charter, as revised in 1907,
is of this type.65 Legislative power remains centralized in the city
council. The principle of the federated city is the same except
for the conferring of certain legislative powers on the boroughs.
A charter of this type was drawn for Allegheny County, Pennsyl-
vania, but failed of adoption.66 As respects both plans, a city-
county under the Ohio Constitution, chartered as a municipal
corporation, would be in no different position from any other
municipality. There is nothing in the constitution and laws to
61 OMo CONsT. Art. X, § 3.
6 "There cannot be, at the same time, within the same territory, two distinct municipal
corporations, exercising the same powers, jurisdictions, and privileges." 1 DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 354, p. 616 (5th
ed. 1911); see Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274, 281 (1874).
63 Omo GEN. CODE § 3576. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514 (1879);
Morgan v. Beliot, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 613 (1868); Township of Bloomfield v.
Borough of Glen Ridge, 54 N. J. Eq. 276, 33 Ati. 925 (Ch. 1896).
64 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS
342, 367 (1930).
65 Id. at 344-356.
66 Id. at 372-387.
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prevent any municipality from delegating administrative powers
to districts set up for that purpose. But while administrative
power may be delegated, legislative power may not.87 Presumably
a further constitutional amendment would be necessary if the
city-county as a municipal corporation were to be given the form
of a federated city. However, a federation in effect could be ob-
tained under the charter plan described immediately below, with
the difference that the central government's powers would be
enumerated and those of the constituent municipalities residual. "
A CHARTER EMBODYING SOME MuNIcIPAL POWERS
Under Article XVIII of the Ohio 'Constitution, no munici-
pality, large or small, may be deprived of any power of local self-
government without its consent. No exception existed until the
adoption of Article X, the county home rule amendment, under
which such a deprivation may be made if a certain four majori-
ties of votes are obtained, " including a majority of those voting
on the question in a majority of the municipalities and townships
in the county for which home rule is sought. Municipal home
rule has yielded to county home rule in one respect-unanimous
consent for the surrender of a municipal power has given way to
majority consent. A county home rule government starting out
with no municipal powers might in time become an institution
of great significance by successive charter amendments vesting in
it municipal powers. As powers were surrendered, the charters
of the various municipalities would require corresponding changes
by abolishing offices which now had no duties. Conceivably suc-
cessive surrenders of powers might eventually leave the munici-
palities mere shells of themselves. They would remain municipal
corporations with attenuated powers; while the county, without
such a status, would exercise some of the substantive powers typi-
cal of a municipal corporation. The state constitution, in effect,
recognizes a second type of municipal corporation which, after
the surrender of powers to the county, does not possess all the
powers of local self-government.
67 Cincinnati v. Cook, 107 Ohio St. 223, 140 N.E. 655 (1923); Akron v. Dod-
son, 81 Ohio St. 66, 90 N.E. 123 (1909); 8 moJuR., Constitutional Law §§
212, 217, 218.
68 Municipal powers vested in the county by the constitutional procedure
would necessarily be specific and enumerated.
69 See note 75 infra.
1949)
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A CHARTER EMBODYING ONLY COUNTY POWERS
The minimal alternative of a county charter commission is
the reorganization of the county government to administer such
powers alone as are conferred on counties by statute. Four coun-
ties, Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Lucas and Mahoning, chose charter
commissions at the general election of November, 1934. All sub-
mitted charters to the electors at the general election the year
following, but only in Cuyahoga County did the charter receive
a county-wide majority of the votes cast on the question. In all
four cases the charter submitted purported to include only county
powers.
A. County Powers.
The state constitution requires as a minimum that provision
be made, in any charter drawn, for the "exercise of all powers
vested in, and the performance of all duties imposed upon counties
and county officers by law"." Presumably, any charter failing to
meet this requirement would be prima facie invalid. Accordingly,
each of the four charters, while enumerating certain powers vested
in the counties by the General Code and apportioning them to
designated officers, prudently indicated a repository for all others,
including such as might thereafter be imposed by law. 1
B. Form of Government.
"Every .. . [county] charter shall provide the form of gov-
ernment of the county and . . . determine which of its officers
shall be elected and the manner of their election." 2 The "form
of government" has reference to the number, names, arrangement
and groupings of offices, and their relations to each other; to
the methods of their choice and terms of office; to the allocation
of duties among them; and, in general, to the administrative pro-
cedure governing them in the performance of their duties. In all
the charters, except that of Mahoning, the manager form of gov-
ernment, widely used in municipalities, was taken as the plan of
the proposed county government; and in the same three, wherever
administrative procedure was left undefined, the board of county
commissioners or the county council, as the case might be, was
70 OIO CONST. Art X, § 3.
71 Proposed Charter for the County of Cuyahoga, Art. II, § 1; County of
Hamilton, Art. I, § 1 and Art. II, § 1; Lucas County, Art. I, § 1 and Art. II,
§ 1; Mahoning County, Art. II, § 1.
7 2 Omo CONST. Art. X, § 3.
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empowered to supply this want, or that prescribed by general
law was adopted."
C. What is a Municipal Power within the Meaning of Article X?
"No charter or amendment vesting any municipal powers in
the county shall become effective unless it shall have been ap-
proved" by four designated majorities." This provision makes
the definition of "municipal power" within the meaning of Article
X of crucial importance. If given a loose meaning, that portion
of Article X authorizing the electors of a county by majority vote
to reform the structure of their government is rendered virtually
inoperative; and, if interpreted narrowly and technically, it de-
prives the electors of the municipalities and townships of the right
to negative propositions to surrender municipal powers to the
county. The correct rule of construction, obviously, is one which
makes effective both methods of charter adoption.
First recourse would seem to be to the definition of municipal
powers in Article XVIII as modified by the implications of Article
X. The frailty of the language of the former, "all the powers of
local self-government", is such as to offer only general guidance,
as attested by many years of judicial handling. More precision
is to be found in the language of Article X. The intent of the
scheme of majorities requisite for the adoption of a county char-
ter is not in doubt:" the three special majorities are called upon
whenever a proposed county charter alters the established balance
of powers between county and municipality. This is the crux
of the matter.
A majority in a county-wide vote may adopt a county charter
altering the form of government but not changing the range of
its powers. The consent of the electors of the municipalities as
such is not required since there is no alteration of the balance of
powers.
Three extra majorities are required if the charter alters the
73 Proposed Charter for the County of Cuyahoga, Art. I, § 3; County of
Hamilton, Art. I, § 1; County of Lucas, Art. I, § 1.
74 Omo CONST. Art. X, § 3.
75 "No charter or amendment vesting any municipal powers in the county
shall become effective unless it shall have been approved by a majority of
those voting thereon (1) in the county, (2) in the largest municipality, (3) in
the county outside of such municipality, and (4) in each of a majority of the
combined total of municipalities and townships in the county (not including
within any township any part of its area lying within a municipality)." Omo
CONST. Art. X, § 3.
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balance of powers between county and municipality to the detri-
ment of the latter: first, a majority of those voting on the ques-
tion in the largest municipality, on the principle that the senior
and major unit of local government with large investments in
facilities for water supply, transportation, recreation and other
services ought to have a veto on any proposal to vest their own-
ership and operation in the county; second, a majority of those
voting on the question in all the county outside the largest munici-
pality; while this may be less defensible, it is a concession to the
interests peculiar to these residential areas; third, a majority vote
in a majority of the municipalities and townships. As explained,
this constitutes the great compromise between municipal autonomy
and home rule on one side and the needs of county and metro-
politan government on the other.
We now are in a position to enumerate the norms, both posi-
tive and negative, which are applicable to the construction of
this portion of the county home rule amendment:
1. The test of the vesting of a municipal power in the county
is whether the charter in effect alters the balance of power be-
tween county and municipality to the detriment of the latter.
2. The Ohio Constitution recognizes two classes of govern-
mental powers: state powers, exercised variously by the central
state government and its subdivisions, the county, township, and
school, health, conservancy, park, and other districts; and munici-
pal powers constitutionally vested in the municipality.
3. There is no inherent quality in a power of government
which makes it "federal", "state", "county" or "municipal".
Rather, a power falls in one of those categories for the simple
reason that it has been so allocated by constitution or statute. The
validity of Montesquieu's classic division of elementary powers
of government into legislative, executive and judicial has not stood
up under closer analysis."6 Nor is there any immutable tradition
which would control a unique delegation of power to a political
subdivision."
4. Provision for the concurrent exercise by county and munici-
pality of powers hitherto vested exclusively in the latter is a vest-
76 MONTEsQIJIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Bk. XI, c. vi (Nugent's ed. 1752).
GooDNOW, POLITCS AND ADMINISTRATION, C. i-iii (1900); WILLOUGHBY,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 10-13 (1927).
77 The legislature may strip a municipality "of every power, leaving it a
corporation in name only; and it may create and re-create these changes as
often as it chooses, or it may itself exercise directly within the locality any or
all of the powers usually committed to a municipality." 1 McQUrmLN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 145, p. 436 (2d ed. 1945).
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ing of municipal powers in the county within the meaning of
Article X.'
5. Provision for the continued exercise of powers already
administered concurrently by county and municipality-as, for
instance, the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state-does
not constitute a vesting of municipal powers in the county within
the meaning of Article X. The charter is required to provide for
"the exercise of all powers vested in, and the performance of all
duties imposed upon counties and county officers by, law","9
whether exclusive or concurrent, and fulfillment of this require-
ment in no way alters the balance of powers between county and
municipality.
6. The inclusion in a county charter of administrative forms,
procedures or the names and titles of offices commonly found in
municipal charters does not constitute a vesting of municipal pow-
ers in the county. These are all components of a "form of govern-
ment '" and the county charter is specifically authorized to
formulate a "form of government". The name of an office does
not define its powers, but rather the terms of the statute creating
the office. Naming the Louisiana county "parish" confers no
ecclesiastical powers; or its county board "police jury" no judicial
powers."1 That the "municipal powers" mentioned in Article
XVIII comprehend only those of a substantive character seems
reasonable. Adoption by a county charter of forms and nomen-
clature usually associated with municipalities in itself has nothing
to do with the alteration of the balance of powers between the two
units.
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Vesting of Municipal Powers
in the County.
The only instance in which the county home rule amendment
was before a court was in State ex rel. Howland v. Krause.8 ' This
was an original action in mandamus to require the defendant to
78 "Any such charter may provide for the concurrent or exclusive exercise by
the county, in all or in part of its area, of all or of any designated powers vested
by the constitution or laws of Ohio in municipalities .... ." OmO CONST.
Art. X, § 3.
79 Omo CONsT. Art. X, § 3.
80 McGoLDmicx, TnE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HomE RULE, 1916-
1930 89-91 (1933), citing State ex rel. Zien v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 355,
159 N.W. 792 (1916); see also 1 McQumLIN, op. cit. supra note 77, § 145.
81 FAIRIn AND KNmR, CouNTY GOVERNMENT AND ADnINISTRATION §§ 115,
225 (1930).
82 130 Ohio St. 455, 200 N. E. 512 (1936).
19491
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
certify that the Cuyahoga charter had been duly approved and
become effective. The charter had been voted for by a majority
of those voting on the question in the county and in the largest
city (Cleveland) but not in the area outside Cleveland or in a
majority of the municipalities and townships. The relator claimed
that the charter vested no municipal powers in the county and
therefore, to become effective, needed only a majority of those
voting on the question in the county. The respondents set forth
various portions of the charter providing, they averred, that certain
municipal powers were to be exercised by the county.
The court held that in "numerous instances" the charter
sought to vest in the county powers which by the constitution and
laws of the state are vested in the municipality. Only four, how-
ever, were cited: the power of the county council to enact ordi-
nances, provision for the use of the initiative and referendum,
the establishment of a civil service commission and the establish-
ment of county police. The first three fall in the category of
administrative agencies and procedure relating to the form of
government; the last-named, in the category of concurrent sub-
stantive powers. The criteria accepted by the court in ruling
these four to be instances of municipal powers seem to be as fol-
lows:
1. The term or name employed in itself confers powers.
The charter used the term "ordinance" for the acts of its
county council, in the place of "resolution", used by the county
commissioners, but confined their scope to such as were "necessary
and proper to carry out the powers conferred on counties and
county officers by this Charter and the Constitution and laws of
the State"." The court concluded: "Clearly the authority to
enact ordinances sought to be conferred upon the county is a
municipal power".84 Since no instance of municipal subject-matter
was cited as having been included in the county council's ordi-
nance-making field, presumably the use of the term ordinance
was the criterion.
2. Employment of agencies and procedures used by munici-
palities in itself confers municipal powers.
Establishment of a county civil service commission, although
83 Proposed Charter for the County of Cuyahoga, Art. IV, § 26.
84 State ex rel. Howland v. Krause, 130 Ohio St. 455, 459, 200 N.E. 512,
514 (1936).
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only for county purposes, was a municipal power because it had
been "conferred upon and long exercised by the cities of this
state"" and had "never been conferred upon a county". 6  The
choice and promotion of civil servants, of course, is a procedural
device for the filling of offices and not a substantive power. The
use of the merit system probably is well within the home rule
powers under the heading "form of government"," but specific
statutory authorization for the employment of civil service com-
missions in charter counties had been given by a statute effective
July 23, 1935.8 Provision for the use of the initiative and the
referendum on county questions likewise was held to be a munici-
pal power.8" As with the merit system, this is not a substantive
power but a method of direct legislation by the people and pre-
sumably within the competence of a county charter in forming a
frame of government.9"
3. Inclusion of powers already exercised concurrently with
the municipality is a vesting of municipal powers in the
county.
By the charter, the offices of sheriff and his deputies had been
abolished and a Department of Public Safety headed by a director
set up.9 It was provided that this new officer should have "all
of the powers by general law now or hereafter vested in, and per-
form all of the duties now or hereafter imposed upon, the Sheriff,
in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State and of the
ordinances of cities and villages within the County"; this was
85 Id. at 460, 200 N.E. at 514.
88 Ibid.
87The right has seldom been questioned in the courts. See Jenkins v. Gronen,
98 Wash. 128, 167 Pac. 916 (1917); McGoLDRIC, op. cit. supra note 80, at 76.
In Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 344, 345, 103 N.E. 512, 514
(1913), the court said that "what officers shall administer the government,
which ones shall be appointed and which elected, and the method of their
appointment and election" are "essentials which are confronted at the very
inception of any undertaking, to prepare the structure or constitution for any
government."
88 Omo GEN. CODE § 2394 specifically authorizes the creation of a county
civil service commission in charter counties.
89 "The initiative and referendum are powers conferred by the Constitution
upon municipalities, and such powers have not been vested by law in counties."
State ex rel. Howland v. Krause, 130 Ohio St. 455, 460, 200 N.E. 512, 514
(1936).
9 See note 80 supra; HOLCo M1E, STATE GOVERNMENT nn THE UNITED STATES,
c. xvi (3d ed. 1931).
91 Proposed Charter for the County of Cuyahoga, Art. XV.
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followed by an enumeration of his other duties in the language of
the statutes. The County Council was authorized to implement
the office: "To establish, maintain, and regulate a police force
for the purpose of preserving the public peace and enforcing the
laws of the State and the ordinances of the County Council.""2
"These powers," the court contended, "are not only generally
recognized as municipal powers, but are specifically so treated by
the laws of the state .... Under this charter, a county-wide police
force is provided for and the safety director is authorized to send
officers into every municipality . . . Nowhere has the Legislature
conferred power upon a sheriff to enforce ordinances of either a
city or a county council.""3 The court cannot have meant that
the sheriff does not have peace powers coextensive with the county,
including all municipalities and townships.04 In fact there is no
statutory demarcation between the peace powers of the sheriff
and those of the municipal police. The significance of the court's
ruling is that provision in a county charter for the continued
exercise of previously established concurrent powers such as the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the state, constitutes a vesting
of municipal powers in the county.
CONCLUSION
Two chief objectives motivated the framers of the county home
rule article of the Ohio Constitution: flexibility in the structure
of the government of the counties to permit adaptation to their
highly varied character and size, and the use of the wider boun-
daries of the county as a vehicle of metropolitan government. The
populous county, both by establishing a modernized and respon-
92 Id. Art. IV, § 18.
93 State ex rel. Howland v. Krause, 130 Ohio St. 455, 460, 200 N.E. 512,
514 (1936).
94 OHo GEN. CODE § 13432-1: "A sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy
marshal, watchman or police officer, herein designated as 'peace officers'
shall arrest and detain a person found violating a law of this state, or an ordi-
nance of a city or village, until a warrant can be obtained." OHio GEN. CODE
§ 2833: "Each sheriff shall preserve the public peace and cause all persons
guilty of breach thereof, within his knowledge or view, to enter into recogniz-
ance with sureties to keep the peace and to appear at the succeeding term of
the common pleas court of the proper county and commit them to jail in case
of refusal .... In the execution of the duties required of him by law, the sheriff
may call to his aid such person or persons or power of the county as may be
necessary." In In re Sulzmann, 125 Ohio St. 594, 597, 183 N.E. 531, 532 (1932),
the court had held that the sheriff was 'the chief law enforcement officer in the
county, with jurisdiction coextensive with the county, including all municipali-
ties and townships."
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sible government and by acquiring from the constituent munici-
palities and townships additional powers, would be in a position
to plan, legislate, and act on those matters which are of concern
to the entire metropolitan community. This would be a step in
the direction of simplification by eliminating overlapping powers
and the necessity of creating special "authorities" for specific
functions. Centralization of municipal powers in the government
of the county is authorized in all degrees, from a complete to only
a slight merging.
Counties also are empowered, without the intervention of a
charter commission, to adopt any alternative charter which the
General Assembly may set up;95 and municipalities and townships
are empowered, with the consent of the county, to transfer to
the county any of their powers.
Many constitutional problems as yet unforeseen in detail would
doubtless emerge in the event that a county home rule charter
had become effective and was in operation. The general grounds
of these have been indicated in the preceding text. In particular
these problems would arise from: the complete dependence of
the county on the legislature for its substantive powers, matters
of bonded debt and taxation incidental to the transfer of munici-
pal properties to the county where the corresponding function
had been transferred, the uncertainty as to whether a given
municipal power had been transferred to the county in whole or
only in part, and the status of the attenuated municipal corpora-
tions. Last and most important, the county, endowed with some
municipal functions, would inherit the perennial problem of the
demarcation between municipal and state powers inherent in
Article XVIII.
The initial problem is that of the law governing the adoption
of county charters not intended to embody municipal powers.
Here the laborious and uncertain method of constitutional revis-
ion might be used in efforts to make clear what provisions such
a charter may contain. That the three majorities, additional to
a majority of those voting in the county, are required to make
effective a general transfer of municipal powers to the county,
while stringent, is not indefensible. This requirement constitutes
a compromise between the concepts of municipal home rule and
county home rule. Perhaps with some reason the requirement of
95 Alternative county charters were introduced in the General Assembly in
S.B. No. 134, 91st General Assembly (1935-1936), and in H.B. No. 464, 92d
General Assembly (1937-1938), but failed of adoption.
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the third majority,-that of a majority of those voting in a majority
of the cities, villages, and townships, might be drawn to exclude
villages and townships. Or revision might include an express ex-
ception of existing concurrent powers of counties and munici-
palities as constituting municipal powers within the meaning of
Article X, and a definition of municipal powers as such. But the
probabilities are that any rephrasing would not clarify but only
add to the legal uncertainties. The fault goes much farther back
than Article X. With the obscurities of the "all powers of local
self government" clause of the municipal home rule article as the
point of departure, the direction which a court would take in any
such case as that of the Cuyahoga County Charter was bound to
be unpredictable. Years of adjudication had brought neither clari-
fication of the phrase nor even a reasonable modus vivendi.9"
The proper remedy for a constitutional provision made ineffec-
tive by judicial rulings is not the laborious device of constitutional
revision but judicial action. The concepts of public law adopted
by the court in the Cuyahoga County charter case for the determi-
nation of what constitutes a vesting of municipal powers in the
county are deserving of re-examination. Those employed logically
render inoperative that portion of the article empowering the
electors by a county-wide vote to reorganize the county govern-
ment with its existing substantive powers. For instance, if a char-
ter fails to make provision for county duties in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the state, it is invalid because of failing to
fulfill constitutional requirements; and if it does make such pro-
vision, having received only a county majority, it is ineffective
because of having embodied a municipal power. The test of
whether a county charter transfers a municipal power should be:
Do the powers embodied in a county charter alter the balance
of powers previously existing between county and municipality
to the detriment of the latter? This test would satisfy the rule
that impinging provisions of constitutions or statutes should be
given that construction which renders both operative. Not to adopt
it is in effect to declare a portion of the constitution inoperative,
and that is a power reserved to the people in their sovereign
capacity. Therefore, a redrafting and readoption of Article X
would seem to hold little of promise; rather, a re-scrutiny by the
court of the norms followed in the Cuyahoga County charter case
is needed.
96 See note 9 supra; McGoLDRICK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL
Hoim RULE, 1916-1930 317-19 (1933).
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